

On the way to a one-child family: are we beyond the point of no return?

(Some considerations concerning the fertility decrease in Russia)

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
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1. Introduction

It is obvious now that below replacement fertility is fixedly established throughout all European countries. Nevertheless, in spite of numerous demographic and sociological investigations, the causes and perspectives of recent fertility decline remain unclear. Moreover, some demographic optimism or ‘magnetic force’ to replacement (Westoff, 1991), which stays intact in population projections as “a medium variant”, is gradually vanishing from internal demographic discourses. (UN, 1997). This does not mean that below replacement fertility is now unanimously considered as a long-term perspective of humanity rather than as the way for the near future. One considers this to be a transitional phenomenon, while cherishing faint hope of the two-child family as an individual normative goal in contemporary society. This hope had been the corner stone of the demographic transition theory, until the late 1980s (Vishnevsky, 1976, 1991). The incongruity between this hope and theory, and the reality of the 1980-1990s, produced “the second demographic transition theory”. (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, 1986) Would it better to attribute the adjective “second” to the noun “theory” not to the “transition”? (Cliquet, 1992).

Since the early 1990s, fertility rolled down below replacement level throughout Europe (*Figure 1*). Nonetheless, the discussion about the causality of this phenomenon was (and remains) sufficiently heterogeneous. The explanations proposed for the western (and southern) part of Europe, mostly pointed to changes in the value structures, and in family formation patterns. (Lesthaeghe and Neels, 2002) At the same time, the consideration regarding the fertility decline in formerly socialist countries of Europe often laid stress on the peculiarity of the transitional period in national economics and social systems (Macura, 1997; Sardon J-P, 1998; Kohler and Kohler, 2001; Philipov, 2002). The discourses appearing in the context of this concept point out again that fertility decline below replacement level was a temporary effect, or a transitional one.

Figure 1: Total fertility dynamics since 1950 in selected European countries



Source: INED on Web: *Conjoncture des Pays Développés en Chiffres Base des Données*.
www.ined.fr

Since the end of the 1990s, the political climate in Europe has changed, and now a number of formerly socialist countries are queuing up to get into the European Union. This new political atmosphere made inconvenient any discourses upon the hardship of the transitional period. Therefore, a “transitional tune” in discussion concerning fertility decline faded out, whereas the anxiety for structural changes in reproductive behaviors advanced to the forefront. More specifically, this concerned the gradual postponement of fertility from one generation to the next, which affects mostly the period fertility indicators as to cohort fertility. One maintains the hope that it could remain intact or, at least, that it should not decrease sharply (Philipov and Kohler, 2001).

Without further discussion about this matter, this paper looks at fertility patterns in Russia, questioning the transitory character of the present-day fertility decline. Our main aim

is to provide some basis for reflection about where we are now, during a period of transient troubles, or at the turning point towards one-child family and one-child life style.

2. Context: Below-Replacement Fertility or Decreasing Fertility?

Recent investigations have shown that below-replacement fertility was established in Russia on a permanent basis as early as the late 1960s. (Avdeev and Monnier, 1995 and 1996; Scherbov and Vianen, 1999, 2002). However, until the beginning of the previous decade, the fertility decline was not as visible as after the impressive fall from 2.59 to 1.99 in the 1960s. The TFR remained relatively stable at slightly below replacement level during the 1970s, increasing simultaneously with the crude birth rate. In the 1980s, the new family policy stimulated a huge growth of the TFR from 1.8 in 1980 to 2.3 in 1987.¹ Thus, the present fertility decrease in Russia followed a strong short-run increase, and this fact blurred the general picture. Therefore, at first one considers the fertility decline as offsetting this earlier growth. (Darsky, 1993). Apparently very reasonable, this explanation implied the expectation that fertility would soon “catch up” again and stabilize at the end of the 1990s, at about the level observed in the 1970s. (Barkalov and Darsky, 1994, p.13) Reality broke these illusions, although the hopes that an upturn would occur remained present.

Throughout the previous decade, the fertility decline in Russia was the object of numerous studies by Russian demographers as well as by western researchers and mixed teams. (Andreev, Bondarskaia and Kharkova, 1998; Avdeev and Monnier, 1994/95; 1999/2000; Barkalov and Darsky, 1994; Blum and Darsky, 1999; Darsky, 1993; Darsky and Bondarskaya, 1995; Philipov and Kohler, 2001; Scherbov and van Vianen, 1999; Zakharov, 1997 and 1999; Zakharov and Ivanova, 1996a and 1996b).

¹ Up to the end of the 1980s, the Russian and Soviet demographers could hardly conduct any detailed investigations of fertility trends because of the lack or unavailability of vital statistics. The first very concise Soviet Demographic Yearbook after the Second World War appeared only in 1973; the next one 15 years later, in 1988.

All of these investigations describe, in depth, the recent fertility changes. However, the causes and prospects remain scientifically unexplained. Three main theoretical statements are presented in most of these studies:


- 1) The economic and social crisis (this term is usually used as a synonym for the social transformation) is not a main cause of fertility decline, but it accelerated the second demographic transition;
- 2) At least during the first half of the 1990s, the reduction of the total fertility rate (TFR) was mostly due to the effects of compensation, and the level of cohort completed fertility might hold;
- 3) The main cause for this period's fertility decline is the change in the age fertility schedule of cohorts or, in others words, the transition from early and highly concentrated fertility to later and more widely spread fertility, like that observed in western countries.

In our analysis, the arguments for and against each of these statements will be discussed.

3. Main Features of Below-Replacement Fertility in Russia

There is not any reliable data in Russian statistics that could allow for making the direct estimation of age specific fertility rates in Russia for the period prior to the 1959 census. Nevertheless, recent studies based on demographic modeling (Andreev, Darsky, Kharkova, 1998) and on the 1994 micro-census data (Scherbov and van Vianen, 1999 and 2002) have given an indication about the fertility decline in the 1950s. In that decade, the TFR decreased from 2.9 to 2.6. The completed fertility of women born between 1924 and 1930, whose behavior determined the period fertility indicators in the 1950s and 1960s, gradually decreased from 2.1 to 2.02. (Avdeev, Monnier, 1995) The dynamics of these period and cohort fertility indicators clearly shows that Russia became a low-fertility country by the end of the 1950s; and the two-child family as a common model of reproductive behavior was settled there not in the latter 1960s, but at least 10 years earlier. (*Figure 2*)

Figure 2: Decline of Total Period Fertility Rate (TFR) and Cohort Completed Fertility (CF) in Russia in XX century



Source: Andreev, Darsky, Kharkova, 1998 (ADKh1998), p.164-165; Scherbov and van Vianen, 1999 (S&V1999), p.133


Note: Indicators of cohort fertility indicators are attached in this graph to the 27th birthday of each cohort, because at that time, it was the mean childbearing age

Two factors determined the relatively important TFR decline between 1959 and 1968.

The first one was the acceleration in the decline of fertility in the countryside. In 1959, the TFR for the rural population was 3.3. By 1968, it had decreased to 2.5 or by 23%. The urban population TFR decreased only by 15% (from 2.0 in 1959 to 1.7 in 1968). At the same time, the proportion of the rural population diminished from 47% to 37% of the total Russian population. This change in rural-urban population ratio was the second factor for the acceleration of the TFR decline in the period from 1959-1968. It maintained this status for the following decade, when the proportion of the rural population continued to fall to 30%. Because of this, *the TFR decline for the whole population was greater than for each of its parts*. In fact, while the urban TFR fell by only 3% and the rural TFR was practically

unchanged between 1968 and 1979, the total population TFR had diminished by 6%. (*Figure 3*) Since the early 1980s, the urban-rural population ratio has stabilized, and this structural factor has lost its importance.

Figure 3: Total period fertility rate (TFR) and mean age at childbearing (MAC) in Russia, 1959-1999.




The parallel decrease of mean age at childbearing (MAC) and the TFR suggests that the Russian population adopted a “stopping model” of family formation. The analysis of trends in marriage in Russia from the beginning of the 1950s to the latter 1990s also supports this hypothesis. (Avdeev and Monnier, 1999/2000).

In the period from 1968-1980, the continuous decline of MAC, expressing an important fertility shift to the younger ages, implied a relative stabilization of the TFR in the countryside as well as in the towns.

The impact of the change in fertility tempo in Russia over the period TFR, estimated using the Bongaarts-Feeney formula (Bongaarts and Feeney, 1998 and 2000), is consistent with recent researches on East European fertility (Philipov and Kohler, 2001). In the latter


1960s and in the 1970s, the adjusted TFR was lower than the observed one: the latter was fluctuating at around 2, and the former – at about 1.8 (*Figure 4*)

Figure 4: *Observed and adjusted with Bongaarts-Feeney formula for the TFR in Russia, 1959-1998*




The mean age at childbearing may decrease because of a reduction of the frequency of high-order births, and/or because of a fertility shift to younger ages. Up to the beginning of the 1970s, the lowering of age at first birth was a principal factor of the MAC decline. Afterwards, the situation changed, and from about 1972, age at birth of any order began to fall. The most significant decline was for the age at fourth- or higher-order births. In the period from 1980-1987, the situation with the MAC changed paradoxically. It grew for births of all orders and at the same time, it decreased for births of each order (*Figure 5*). The inverse situation occurred in the U.S. between 1965 and 1974, when the mean age for births of all orders decreased while the mean age at birth of each order rose. (Bongaarts and Feeney, 1998, p.281).

Figure 5: Mean age at birth of different orders (Russia, 1959-1998)




This upturn of the overall MAC trend in Russia was due to an increase in the relative quantum of births of second- (from 34% to 38%) and third- (from 8% to 12%) orders (*Figure 6*).

Figure 6: Change in structure of the TFR by order of births, (Russia, 1959-1997)




As well as the fertility shift to younger ages, an almost complete disappearance of high order births and very low childlessness characterized the low fertility in Russia (*Figure 7*). Thus, “the average low fertility” in Russia expressed a very homogeneous reproductive behavior of Russian families. It is possible to say that since the early 1960s, the motto of Russian women with regard to fertility has been, “Everybody, early, few and quickly.”

Figure 7: The TFR composed by total parity fertility rates, Russia 1959-1998



In contrast with the general homogeneity of “one-or-two child” reproductive behavior only a few couples continued to have large families of more than three children. (Avdeev and Monnier, 1994/1995; Barkalov and Darsky, 1994; Andreev and Barlalov, 1999). Moreover, the probability fourth- or higher-order births rises gradually, whereas the probability of third birth remains very low. (Figure 8) This paradox of Russian fertility proves that third birth in Russia is rather a stage in the formation of the “large family than a deviation from the two-child model. Hence, in the Russian model of fertility, there is a strong quantitative relation between third- and higher-order births, but an insurmountable barrier between two opposite models of reproductive behavior separates second- and third-order births.

Figure 8: Parity progression ratio for the period cohort 1979-1994, and birth cohort aged 45-49 at the time of 1989 Census.




Sources: Barkalov and Darsky, 1994, p.19 (birth cohort); Andreev and Barlalov, 1999, p.66 (period cohorts)

In the period from 1981-1987, the introduction of a new family policy produced a significant rise in fertility, as well as in the mean age at childbearing, but the general model of Russian fertility has remained unchanged.² The effects of this policy are very complex. It influenced the quantum of fertility among the under-30s, as well as the fertility tempo of these cohorts. The primary result of this policy has been a strong compression of the fertility timing of women born between 1954 and 1965, which has produced a significant growth of cumulative fertility at ages 25 and 30. At the same time, the increase at age 35 in cohorts born in 1954-1960 was very weak, and the cumulative fertility at age 40 has remained unchanged (*Figure 9*). Hence, the new family policy only helped Russian families to accomplish their reproductive plans sooner, but it did not turn them away from the two-child family model.

² Soviet history provides a good example of how social policy may influence fertility. There are numerous studies on Soviet family and population policy in which scholars sometimes draw quite different conclusions (David and McIntyre, 1981; Chambre, 1954, Glass and Stolee, 1987)

Figure 9: Cohort completed fertility and cumulative cohort fertility at selected ages




4. The “Catastrophe” of the 1990s

Fertility in Russia began to decline anew in the latter 1980s, when the Soviet economy entered a deep depression and the real value of the fertility stimulating measures was reduced. The changes in age-specific fertility show that until the early 1990s, the fertility decline resulted mostly from the compensation of previous growth (*Figure 10*). Actually, between 1987 and 1994, not only the TFR but also the MAC decreased, signifying a low participation of older birth cohorts in the period fertility, and a substantial decrease of second- and third-order births. (*Figure 3, Figure 5* and *Figure 7*). But this “compensation period” ended in 1990, when the first-birth TFR started to decline, and the TFR of orders two and three relatively stabilized.

Since 1995, MAC has grown, in contrast with the continuous decline of the TFR. This situation might appear to conform to the fertility-aging scenario, but a detailed analysis shows that this is not the case. Although MAC of each birth order increases, an important decline of age specific fertility is observed at all ages higher than 20. The modal age of fertility has

moved from 21-22 years (as it had been for three decades) to 19-20, and the shape of age-specific fertility in 1995 seems even younger than it had been in 1978. Therefore, since the mid-1990s, the fertility decline in Russia should be attributed neither to the compensation of 1981-1987 growth, or to fertility aging. This apparently expressed a real fertility decline.

Figure 10: Age-period-specific fertility rates in Russia from 1978-1999.





Note for Figure 10: A red line connects the period indicators for 1987 and 1991, produced by the same birth cohort)


For 1999, the combined age-period-specific fertility rates for all birth orders maintain about the same structure as in the 1980s, with the modal age at 21.

Even if the mean age decreases because of more significant fertility decline in the middle reproductive ages, one cannot say that fertility shifts to the older ages. The observed changes in age specific fertility rates for first, second and third births strongly support the hypothesis that the social and economic transformations, begun in 1992, have led to a real fertility decline (*Figure 11*).

Figure 11: Age-period-specific fertility rates for first, second and third births, Russia, 1978-1998



Third birth (left side view).



5. Changes in Regional and Social Fertility Differentials: Diffusion or Adaptation

In their analysis, Zakharov and Ivanova explain the regional fertility differentials in Russia from 1959-1994, by an “adaptation model” of fertility transition. They argue that during the periods of slow evolution or relative stability of fertility, the regional differences’ “descent to a certain limit appears as the leading vector of change in the periods of relative stability.” In contrast, during periods of “quick change ... regional differences grow significantly again.” (Zakharov and Ivanova, 1996, p.354) This explanation might be questionable even for a long-term demographic transition (Guinnane, Okun and Trussel, 1994); and it is hardly coherent with fertility decline in Russia during the previous decade.


The analysis of regional differentiation of the TFR in 1999, in comparison with 1989, shows that Russian fertility demonstrates an innovation, rather than an adaptation model of fertility change. In fact, the TFR decreased throughout the country on an average of 41%. The

strongest decline was recorded in the region of Khabarovsk (Russian Extreme-Orient), where the TFR decreased from 2.093 in 1989 to 1.03 in 1999, a 51% reduction. The smallest decline was recorded in Caucasus, in the Ingoush Republic, where vital statistics for the previous decade are very uncertain. If we exclude this region from the analysis, then the minimum of fertility decline moves to Kamchatka, where the TFR declined by 30%.

Although fertility decreased considerably in Russia between 1989 and 1999, its territorial structure has remained practically unchanged. Thus, in 1999, most regions maintained the same position relative to the national level of TFR that they had in the early stage of the fertility decline (*Figure 12*).

The social differentiation of fertility in Russia has been insufficiently explored. Yet some results of a study on births recorded in 1993 indicate that the degree of fertility decline was similar across all social strata (Andreev, Bondarskaya and Kharkova, 1998).


Figure 12:



6. The Cohort Dimension: Questionable Postponement and Uncertain Recuperation

Up to now, cohort fertility has decreased essentially at ages 20-25, and has held its ground above this age. It is interesting and important to note that the fertility peak has not shifted to higher ages, and has remained at about age 20 in the 1975 and 1970 birth cohorts. The mode of the fertility curve has even moved towards slightly younger ages (*Figure 13*). This change, in the shape of age-specific cohort fertility, signifies a substantial postponement of first births and a renunciation of subsequent births in the cohorts. However unpredictable the shape of age-specific cohort fertility may be, in contrast with period fertility, it is hard to imagine a recovery sufficient to bring completed cohort fertility to the previous level of 1.8.

Figure 13: Age-specific fertility rates of the selected female birth cohorts



Notes for Figure 13:

- Women born in 1948 had mostly achieved their fertility intentions before the reinforcement of family policy in the 1980s;
- Female cohorts born in 1955, 1960, 1965 were involved in the “baby-boom” of the 1980s;
- The young cohorts 1965-1975 were the main actors in the Russian fertility scene of the 1990s.

The analysis of cohort fertility gives weight to the argument that the recent fertility decline is not simply a matter of delayed child bearing, but more probably an expression of the transition from the two-child to the one-child family. This transition might be the above-mentioned fourth scenario of fertility evolution, which escaped the attention of demographers in the 1990s.

7. From Two-child to One-child Family: Has the Point of No Return Already Been Crossed?

Most demographic projections vary around some “medium variant” which presents more or less rapid, but always fatal, return of fertility to a replacement level. How realistic could such an assumption be today? The analysts from the Demographic Division of the UN Secretariat maintain their fidelity with the “medium” variant, trying to bring it into accord with observed trends by postponing the period of attainment of the “magic” replacement level. At the same time, they point out that “the historical experience up to date does not suggest the stabilization of fertility at replacement level” and “the methods of formulating fertility assumptions for countries whose fertility level is currently below replacement represent an evolving attempt at better approximating future reality.” Nevertheless, the unlikely variants of fertility growth remain in population projection “partly because reproductive intentions stated in opinion surveys consistently reveal a strong trend toward the two-child family as a normative goal.” (UN, 1997, especially, pp. 96-97, 101)

However, the question remains – What is the two-child family? Obviously, as normative goal, the two-child family is something nice, socially approved and appropriate to everyday philistine’s consciousness. However, such conventional norm (“normative goal”) could be very far from reality as well as from the internal norms and attitudes (Andreev and Bondarskaya, 2000). On the contrary, the social and demographic meaning of the two-child family is less clear. First, because it is obvious that should the two-child family be a dominant social model, then fertility could never reach replacement level. The simple model of parity

distribution in any generation, where two children is the statistical (and social) mode, illustrates this consideration. Only the first line on the table below presents parity distribution, assuming a replacement of generation. From that, we assume an accomplishment of the following conditions: every woman gets married and the proportion of childless woman is closer to the natural infecundity level. It is easy to see that in these unrealistic circumstances, a quarter of women (of family) should have more than two children to assume the replacement fertility level.

The simulation could continue, but evidently when the “two-child family” dominates as “a normative goal”, there are the third, fourth and subsequent births that assume the replacement level and these are presently disappearing from the European demographic stage. The absolutely unrealistic “pure” model of the two-child family (5% childlessness, 5% one-child, 85% two-child and 5% three and more children) assumes completed fertility only at the level of 1.9, which is far from the replacement level.

Table 1: Model of completed cohort fertility (distribution in % of women 44 years old by number of alive children)


<i>Type of model</i>	Number of children						All	TCF
	0	1	2	3	4	5.7		
1) 2-children	5.0%	10.0%	60,0%	20.0%	2.50%	2.5%	100%	2.143
2) 2-children	5.0%	20.0%	60,0%	10.0%	2.50%	2.5%	100%	1.943
3) 2-children	5.0%	20.0%	65.0%	5.0%	2.50%	2.5%	100%	1.893
4) 2-children	5.0%	30.0%	55.0%	5.0%	2.50%	2.5%	100%	1.793
5) 2-children	5.0%	35.0%	50.0%	5.0%	2.50%	2.5%	100%	1.743
6) 2-children	7.0%	30.0%	50,0%	7.0%	2.00%	4.0%	100%	1.818
7) 2-children	10.0%	35,0%	45,0%	7.0%	2.00%	1.0%	100%	1.597
8) 2-children	10.0%	40.0%	40,0%	7.0%	2.00%	1.0%	100%	1.547
9) One-child	10.0%	50.0%	30,0%	7.0%	2.00%	1.0%	100%	1.447
10) One-child	10.0%	50.0%	30,0%	7.0%	2.00%	1.0%	100%	1.447
11) One-child	10.0%	55.0%	28,0%	5.0%	1.00%	1.0%	100%	1.357
Urban women 40 years old in 1989 (Russia)	8.0%	32.00%	47,0%	8.0%	1.5%	3.5%	100%	1.760
Rural women 40 years old in 1989(Russia)	6.0%	15.00%	42.0%	20.0%	7.00%	10.0%	100%	2.440
Russian women 40 years old in 1989	8.0%	30.00%	46.0%	11.0%	2.5%	2.5%	100%	1.793

Comparison of line 8 and 9 in Table 1 also shows the frailty of such a notion as “two-child family as normative goal”, because the transition from “two-child” towards “one-child” happens imperceptibly. The final lines of Table 1 contain the data from the 1989 census on the number of children ever born alive, including those who have already died. It is not hard to see that in the urban population, female cohorts born at the end of 1940s are balancing between the two- and one-child family. However, the women of the same generation who were living at the time of this census in the countryside, keep the “two-child model” when 37% of them have three children and more. To suppose that demographic behavior of a later generation of Russian women present the model for the future (or normative goal of up-to-date European society), one must have an unrealistic optimism, verging on the delusional

It is important to note that in European countries, the same female generations (40-44 years by the end of the 1980s – first half of 1990s) have parity distribution that balances between the two- and one-child model (Figure 14).

Usually, the “fork” of demographic projection varies around the “medium” variant, which is hardly realistic to date. Actually this “medium” variant presents “an independent” variable in the projection models. However, if the absolute domination of the two-child family could be established, where a key motivating factor to have a second child would be the desire for a child of another sex, then total fertility would aspire to 1.4-1.7 by a woman with a relatively lower level childlessness. That is a propitious or optimistic scenario. Should this not be the case, the fertility will move to an older age (after 30), with an extreme postponement of childbearing, where the main motivating consideration would be a fear of staying childless. In this case, the transition to the one-child model is practically unavoidable and total fertility will gravitate towards 1.1-1.3 with a relatively high level of definitive childlessness. This is an inauspicious or pessimistic scenario. Apparently, there is not sufficient room here for the “medium” variant.

Figure 14 *Distribution of women aged 40-44 years old at the time of survey by parity in selected European countries. (Data of European Family and Fertility Survey, 1988-1997)*



It seems that the time has come to change this position, and from this time forward, there ought to be engaging discussions over minimum and maximums. Then the “magic” medium variant of fertility projection will turn into a simple statistical average and into a “dependent variable” in population projections.

It seems that since 1994, the Russian demographers have excluded the notion “replacement fertility” from their lexicon, but they kept some of their optimism till the end of the 1990s. Published at the beginning of 1995, the demographic projection of the Institute for the Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences shows the slow growth of the TFR to 1.62 by 2000, then to 1.74 by 2015. The low variant proposes the decline of the TFR to 1.54 by 2000 and to 1.43 by 2015 (Vishnevsky and Vassin, 1995). It is possible to presume that the authors made their projection using 1992 as a base, because in 1995, the TFR had

already been below 1.4. The idea of the two-child family was obviously present in that projection.

The reality surpasses the worst expectations, and in 1999, the TFR decreased to 1.75, which is a quarter below “low variant”. Therefore, in 2000 the Center of Human Ecology and Demography (CHED) published a new projection of the Russian population, which stated a very pessimistic outlook of the fertility perspectives. The “upper” variant foresaw the growth of the TFR to 1.37 by 2020. This gave definitive approval to the one-child family as a future model of family and fertility in Russia (CHED, 1999 and 2000).

8. Conclusion

The Russian two-child family system had appeared to be very resistant, whatever the conditions created by the successive changes in Soviet family policy. Nevertheless, the deep social and economic transformations launched since the beginning of the 1990s have probably instigated the transition to a one-child family model. Our present experience and state of knowledge does not allow us to predict the future course of Russian fertility. That calls for investigations, especially into the social and psychological aspects of low-fertility reproductive behavior. Nowadays, the optimists can expect the return to the two-child family system just as much as the pessimists can wait for the definitive adoption of the one-child family. Only one thing is more or less obvious, and that is that fertility trends observed in 1990s Russia does not look like a temporary reaction or adaptation of the two-child system to a “new social environment”.

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